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Endrew F.'s Unintended Consequences
CLAIRE RAJ and EMILY SUSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court held that students
with disabilities have a substantive right to a "free appropriate public
education," or "FAPE," under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA).' At that time, however, it declined to set a
standard for evaluating that right.2 This year, the Court re-visited the
issue in Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District
and finally and unanimously set that standard.4 In doing so, it walked a
middle ground between plaintiff Endrew F.'s desired outcome and that
of the respondent school district. The Court did not conclude that FAPE
requires "an education that aims to provide a child with a disability
opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and
contribute to society that are substantially equal to those opportunities
afforded children without disabilities," as Endrew and his parents
advocated.5 It also declined to find that FAPE means that a child must
make "merely more than de minimis" progress, as the school district
urged.6 Instead, the Court determined that a child's individualized
education program (IEP), the document that sets out a child's special

*Assistant Professors of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. We would like to
thank Professor Josie Brown and the Journal of Law and Education for inviting us to contribute to
this important discussion.
1. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 210 (1982).
2. See id.
3. 137 S.Ct. 988 (2017).
4. Id. at 993 (referring to its prior decision in Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Rowley, the Court noted that it had declined to determine when a child was receiving
sufficient services to satisfy the FAPE requirement, but that "[lt]hat 'more difficult problem' is
before us today.")
5. Id. at 1001.
6. Id. at 1000.
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education services, must be "reasonably calculated to enable a child to
make progress appropriate in light of the child' s circumstances."'
Although many disability rights advocates praised the Court's holding
as finally putting teeth in the substantive meaning of FAPE, the Endrew
F. standard presents steep pitfalls for low-income parents who seek to
assert their child's rights under the IDEA. When read together with the
Court's previous decisions in Arlington Central School DistrictBoard of
Education v. Murphy8 and Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,9 Endrew
F.'s new FAPE standard further entrenches the extant disparities between
the special education programs of low-income children with disabilities
and those who come from higher income families."0
By setting such an individualized standard, the fulfillment of which
will be as different as each child with a disability, the Endrew F.
decision virtually requires parents of children with disabilities to
marshal substantial resources, including expert opinions, if they
disagree with the IEP offered by their child's school. Yet, in Arlington,
the Court concluded that parents have no right to reimbursement for
expert services if they prevail in IDEA litigation against the school
district beyond the statutory rate for travel reimbursement for
witnesses." In Schaffer, the Court announced that the burden of proof
will be on the moving party-typically the parents-in any challenges
to the IEP. 2 If parents do not have the resources to independently locate
and pay for experts and other costs of proving IEPs inadequate,
shouldering the burden of proof to successfully traverse the Endrew F.
middle ground will be a difficult, if not impossible, task.
To put the new holding into context, it is helpful to explore the facts
of Endrew F.'s case in more detail. Endrew qualified for special
education services under the IDEA because of his disabilities, autism

7. Id. at 999.
8. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
9. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. Arlington, 548 U.S. at 298-300. That rate was, at the time of the decision, $40 per diem
and still is now. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012). The expert fees in Arlington amounted to almost
$30,000. Arlington, 548 U.S. at 294.
12. Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005).
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and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)."3 He attended a
public elementary school through part of fourth grade, when his parents
enrolled him in a private elementary school for children with autism. 4
They made this switch after becoming frustrated with Endrew's lack of
progress in school and the school's seeming unwillingness to change its
teaching approach to address his challenges. Endrew struggled with
behavioral problems in school, which inhibited his ability to learn. For
example, Endrew's teachers reported that he would "scream in class,
climb over furniture and other students, and occasionally run away from
school." 5 Endrew's IEPs "largely carried over the same basic goals and
objectives" from year to year, despite his failure to demonstrate progress
towards these goals. 6
At his new private school, Endrew received a "behavior intervention
plan" and additional academic goals on his IEP, resulting in significant
behavioral improvements and "permitting him to make a degree of
academic progress that had eluded him in the public school.""
Approximately six months after enrolling in the private school and despite
this progress, the public school district again offered Endrew an IEP that
largely mirrored his previous public school IEPs."8 In other words, the
school district insisted that the IEPs they had developed provided Endrew
with a FAPE. Endrew and his parents challenged this contention with the
evidence from Endrew's time at the private school and the experts they
retained. 9 They could do so, however, only because they had the resources
to know about and pay for his private school tuition, evaluations by
independent experts, and, of course, retain an attorney.
Changing the facts of Endrew F. only slightly demonstrates the
importance of parents' socio-economic status to a successful FAPE
challenge. If Endrew's parents were poor, they could not have afforded

13. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128659, at *2 (D. Colo. Sep. 15, 2014).
14. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 996.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 995.
18. Id. at 997.
19. Endrew F., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128659, at *25-26 (Endrew's parents paid for an
evaluation by an independent neuropsychologist who evaluated Endrew, reviewed his records,
and testified that she could not discern any "'measurable progress."')
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to (1) pay the high costs of tuition at private school, (2) pay for private
expert witnesses, and (3) hire a private attorney to sue the school
district. Lacking those informational and financial resources, Endrew
would have had substantial difficulty proving that his public school
IEPs were inadequate under the new Supreme Court standard. The new
standard requires Endrew to demonstrate that a school failed to offer "an
IEP reasonably calculated to enable [him] to make progress appropriate
in light of [his] circumstances. 2 ° In other words, Endrew must prove his
unique circumstances allow him to make a certain amount of progress
and that the school's IEP failed to offer sufficient supports and services
to allow him to hit that mark.
If Endrew had to prove that standard, it would have required him to
have experts who could opine on what progress he was capable of as
well as what educational supports he needed to achieve that progress. In
its defense, the school district could and would then likely argue that
Endrew's progress in public school, however minimal, was appropriate
given his unique circumstances, namely the combined effects of his
disabilities. Not only would the school district make this argument, it
could draw on its own experts to prove it. The school district has at its
disposal psychologists and other therapists and teachers who can assert
that the combined effects of Endrew's disabilities rendered him unable
to make any more progress than he had been making in the public
school. 2' Lacking the ability to find and pay for experts to opine
otherwise, Endrew and his parents would have a nearly impossible time
disproving such arguments. Further, without the means to front the high
tuition costs at Endrew's private school, Endrew's parents would not
have been able to present the compelling evidence of Endrew's progress
when more appropriate educational supports were in place.
While the standard the Supreme Court set forth for determining FAPE
undoubtedly marks a victory for students with disabilities and is markedly
better than the "more than de minimis" standard it rejected, the victory is

20. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 999.
21. As Sasha Pudeleski, a lobbyist for the School Superintendents' Association, said in
reaction to the Endrew F. decision, "[the Endrew F. standard] is a flexible standard that defers to
the expertise of the schools." Laura McKenna, How a New Supreme Court Ruling Could Affect
Special Education, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/

archive/2017/03/how-a-new-supreme-court-ruling-could-affect-special-education/520662/.
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hollow for many low-income children with disabilities. Because of the
combined rulings of Schaffer and Arlington, low-income parents bear the
burden of proof in their due process challenges to FAPE and cannot be
reimbursed by the school district for the experts who would provide the
evidence necessary to carry this burden.22 Lacking the benefit of
reimbursement, these parents cannot access expert assistance and
effectively counter a school district's assertions about the adequacy of
FAPE. The solution to this inequity is not within the FAPE standard
itself, but through leveling the playing field for low-income parents. If all
parents were on more equal footing with the school district in terms of
access to relevant educational information and the experts to interpret that
information, parents would be able to better engage with IDEA's
remedial provisions and ensure an adequate provision of FAPE.
To explain this more fully, Part I of this Essay will contextualize the
numbers of low-income children with disabilities and explain the
disparities in special education for these children embedded in the
structure of the IDEA. Drawing from the work of other scholars, these
disparities can be distilled into three components: information
asymmetries, leverage inadequacies, and transaction costs. Part II then
will argue that Endrew F., read together with Arlington and Schaffer,
exacerbates these problems. Its standard and dicta, which admonishes
reviewing courts to give school districts deference, both further entrench
the IDEA disparities along socio-economic lines. Part III offers
recommendations for reducing these disparities in the form of
amendments to the IDEA.

22. While the impact of the Arlington and Schaffer rulings on low-income families has
previously been analyzed, see Kelly D. Thomason, The Costs of A "Free" Education: The Impact
of Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, 57 DUKE L.J. 457
(2007), this analysis has not yet been applied to the Endrew F. ruling.
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II. IDEA DISPARITIES FOR LOW-INCOME CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES
The IDEA exists to serve all qualifying children with disabilities,
regardless of income.23 Significantly, though, an overwhelming
percentage of children being served under the IDEA live in poverty.24
As Eloise Pasachoff, among others, has demonstrated, the IDEA serves
these children less well than it does children with disabilities who come
from higher income families.25 It creates information and enforcement
disparities that advantage wealthier families and disadvantage lowincome families.26 These disparities can leave lower income children
with substantively lesser educational programs.2 Therefore, as much as
the IDEA is intended for all, its benefits are less accessible to some.
A. The Numbers of Low-Income Children in Special Education
Poverty and disability are closely linked.2" Poverty has been cited as
both a contributing cause and an effect of disability.29 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the number of children with disabilities who live in poverty is
increasing." Between 2001 and 2011, the overall rate of childhood

23. Children qualify for special education and related services under the IDEA if they have a
disability that falls under a statutory disability category and the disability has an adverse impact
on education performance and consequently requires the provision of special education. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.8. The law has no income requirement for eligibility. Id.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413,1431 (2011).
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1431; Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in
Special Education, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLICY 171, 178-179 (2005).
28. NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI., ENG'G, AND TECH., MENTAL DISORDERS AND DISABILITIES AMONG

Low-INCOME CHILDREN 105 (Thomas F. Boat & Joel T. Wu eds., 2015); see also Jim Ryan,
Poverty as Disability and the Futureof Special Education Law, 101 GEO. L. J. 1455, 1491 (2013)

(concluding a review of neuroscience research, 1I1t seems increasingly likely that low SES
ne2ativelv affects brain development in 'ihvsical mechanistic ways' that are 'no less concrete and
real' than genetics, disease, or exposure to neurotoxins.").
29. Id.; see also Kuhlthau et al., Financial Burdens for Families of Children with Special
Health Care Needs, 9 MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH J. 207,214 (2005).

30. Houtrow et al., Changing Trends in Childhood Disability 2001 2014, 134 PEDIATRICS
530 (2014).
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disability increased by over 15%.31 During that same time period, the
rate of children with disabilities living in poverty increased by almost
11%.32 In addition, children in poverty have higher absolute rates of
disability than children from higher income families.33
Of these children, many or most qualify for special education. 4
Poverty, therefore, is prevalent among children receiving special
education services. According to a 2004 study, 32% of children
receiving special education lived in households making less than
$25,000 per year, and 37% lived in households making less than
$50,000 per year. 5
B. Disparities in Special Education That Disadvantage Low-Income
Children
Among the problems that the many low-income families of children
with disabilities must confront when navigating the special education
system are problems that uniquely affect them because of their lowincome status. As Eloise Pasachoff and Daniela Caruso have both
powerfully pointed out, features of the IDEA create disparities that
disadvantage low-income families of children with disabilities.36
Pasachoff categorizes the features as information asymmetries, negative

31. Id. at 533 (2014); see also Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families without Means:
Causes and Correctionsfrom the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POLICY &L. 107, 112-113 (2011).

32. Houtrow, supra note 30, at 534.
33. Id.
34. Children qualify for special education if they have a disability that falls into one of the

IDEA's enumerated disability categories, and it has an adverse impact on their educational
performance such that they need special education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. Because these disability
categories are broadly written, most disabilities fall into one of the disability categories. Id.
35. Blackorby et al., Special Education Elementary Longitudinal Study, Wave 1 Wave 2
Overview (Aug. 2004), https://www.seels.net/designdocs/wlw2/SEELSW1W2-complete-

report.pdf. Further, poverty and disability are problems that beget other problems. For example,
studies have found that parents of children with disabilities or special health care needs were 78%
more likely to have worried they will run out of food and 72% more likely to have been unable to
pay their rent. Parish et al., Material Hardship in U.S. Families Raising Children with
Disabilities, 75 COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 71, 84 (2008) (demonstrating the

inadequacies of income as the measure of hardship for families of children with special health
care needs).
36. Caruso, supra note 27.

506

Journal of Law & Education

[Vol. 46, No. 4

externalities, and transaction costs.3 These disparities inure to the
substantive special education program offered to low-income children
with disabilities.38 They can cause low-income families to have more
difficulty obtaining IEPs as robust as those obtained by higher income
families for their children.39 These disparities make FAPE, therefore,
dependent on income.40
1. Information Asymmetries
The process of developing an IEP requires substantial parental
involvement.4" Parents are required to be at IEP meetings and consent to
the initial provision of special education and related services.42 They
also are required to participate in IEP placement decisions about their
children.43 Although these requirements are designed to protect parents
by forcing schools to ensure parental involvement in the special
education process, effective parental participation requires more than
just a seat at the table. It requires substantial information and the ability
to leverage that information.44 That information is more readily
available to wealthier parents than to low-income parents.45 The same is
true of the ability to leverage such information via lawyers or the threat
of litigation. Without access to these resources, parents may be present

37. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1437.
38. Id. at 1431; Caruso, supra note 27, at 178-179.
39. Pasachoff notes that it is difficult to parse whether this difference in the IEPs is a matter
of equity such that the low-income children are receiving a legally adequate but still less good
IEP than higher income children one of inadequacy itself. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1433.
Either way, she contends the difference is troubling because the IDEA does not intend to
distribute on the basis of wealth. Id. at 1434; see also Margaret M. Wakelin, Comment,
Challenging Disparitiesin Special Education, 3 N.W. J.L. & Soc. POLICY 263 (2008) ("In lowincome and minority communities, children with disabilities are consistently denied appropriate
educational services.")
40. See id.
41. "Con2ress incorporated an elaborate set of what it labeled 'procedural safe2uards' [in the
IDEA] to insure the full participation of the parents and proper resolution of substantive
disagreements." Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).
42. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.300, 300.501.
43. 34 C.F.R. 300.501(c). Placement decisions are decisions about "overall educational
environment rather than the precise location in which the disabled student is educated." A.W. ex
rel. Wilson v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 676 (4th Cir. 2004).
44. See infra text accompanying note 48.
45. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1438.
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in the special education process but hamstrung in their ability to be
involved in the decision-making and, ultimately, unable to ensure
schools meet their FAPE obligation.46
To fully participate in the special education process, parents need
substantial specialized information about their child's disability, its
effects, IDEA procedural requirements, and the available services that
could be provided to their children. 4 Parents also need information
about the impacts of their child's disability on education and resulting
needs in school.4 8 In addition, they need information about what services
they are entitled to from the school system and to what extent those
overlap with their children's needs.49 Further, they need information
about what services other children with disabilities are receiving
because that information provides a metric for whether the school has
offered them an adequate level of services."
Wealthier parents have more social and material capital than lowincome families and consequently have more access to this information
and the ability to deploy it." Social capital includes networks and
relationships. 2 Wealthier families' greater social capital gives them
greater access to networks with information about the services a school
might provide a student with a disability and the specialists who can
help determine what services a child with a disability might need. 3
Wealthier families' greater material capital enables them to pay for

46. id.
47. Id. at 1439.
48. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(1)(2) (the child's needs arising out of his or her disability drive the
goals and services on the IEP); see also Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren't Enough:
External Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1828 (2008) (noting "parents are
unlikely to be able to classify their child's abilities according to recognized diagnostic criteria for
disabilities" and "are unaware of the educational options and services available to" their
children.).
49. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1437-38.
50. Id. at 1439.
51. Carol Vincent & Jane Martin, Class, Culture and Agency: Researching ParentalVoice,
23 DisCOURSE 109, 113 (2002). In a study on parental "voice," meaning "communicative action,"
Carol Vincent and Jane Martin examined the relationship between material, social, and cultural
capital on the likelihood of parents to exercise their voice in their children's school. They found
wealthier parents have more capital and consequently are more likely to exercise their voice. Id.
52. See id.
53. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1438.
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specialists who can provide information on what a child needs. 4 These
resources can result in substantive improvements in IEPs for children."
Low-income parents lack the same social and material capital
available to wealthier parents.56 Their relative lack of social capital
leaves them without access to the deep and varied social networks
wealthier parents have available.5 Consequently, they have more
limited access to information about therapists and evaluators, special
education programs, and other related information these networks
provide.58 Low-income parents, therefore, will have a harder time
knowing when a child is receiving a substantively inadequate level of
services, particularly in relation to what other children in the school
district are being provided and, more importantly, what the school
district is obligated to provide.59 Even when they do know about such
inadequacies, they still lack the financial wherewithal to access the
resources to improve the services. 61 So, even if low-income parents are
present throughout the IEP development and placement process, they
may not be able to participate in it in the same way that wealthier
parents participate. Consequently, low-income parents are more,
perhaps substantially more, likely to have to rely on the school's
determination of whether their child is receiving FAPE, no matter how
inadequate or biased it may be.
2. Leverage Inadequacies
Eloise Pasachoff and Daniela Caruso have identified a number of
negative externalities for low-income parents in the special education
process. 616 One-leverage inadequacies-is particularly relevant here.62

54. See id.
55. See id. 1431; Caruso, supra note 27, at 178-179.
56. Supra note 51 at 124.
57. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1438.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1439.
60. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 314 (2006). The
cost of the expert for whom the parents sought reimbursement in Arlington was nearly $30,000,
which is cost prohibitive for a low-income family of a child with a disability. That amount is
approximately the total annual income of one quarter of children with disabilities, that is an
annual income. Houtrow, supra note 30.
61. Caruso, supra note 27, at 178-179; Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1441.
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Even if low-income parents of children with disabilities know that that
their child is not being offered a FAPE, they often lack the ability to
leverage litigation or the threat of litigation as a way to incentivize more
or better services from their school district.63 Without this stick, poor
parents have significantly less ability to force a school to provide any
service it is not already inclined to provide.64 In other words, parents
without access to attorneys are more or less at the mercy of the school' s
decisions regarding quality, quantity and types of special education and
related services offered to their child.
As Daniela Caruso points out, the capacity to realistically threaten
litigation-even implicitly by way of the presence of lawyers for the
family at IEP development meetings-turns the IEP meeting into a
"bilateral exchange of promises."65 The school provides more services
than it would have otherwise in exchange for the family's implicit or
explicit agreement not to pursue litigation.66 In contrast, low-income
families, who are far less likely to have access to lawyers, engage in
only a unilateral exchange, where they must accept the offered
services.6 As such, the IEP represents at best a "statement of what the
educational agency feels legally obliged to do" and at worst offers the
services the agency feels it can get away with offering, regardless of
whether it meets legal requirements.68 Even if it does not meet legal
requirements, parents who lack the resources to do anything about it
will simply act as "consenting recipients" of federal entitlements,
however inadequate they may be.69
3. Transaction Costs
When low-income parents do challenge schools, either informally in
an IEP meeting or formally through litigation, the costs of those
challenges are higher for them than for wealthier families. These costs

62. Caruso, supra note
63. Caruso, supra note
64. Caruso, supra note
65. Caruso, supra note
66. See id.
67. Caruso, supra note
68. Caruso, supra note
69. Id.

27,
27,
27,
27,

at
at
at
at

178-179; Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1441.
178-179; Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1441.
178; Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1441.
179.

27, at 181; see infra Part
27, at 178.

I.C.
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include the expenditure of social and material capital."° The social
capital required to challenge school decisions includes a sense of agency
and confidence to assert one's voice in school, which may be closely
tied to whether or not parents feel they have the option to leave that
school if it continues to fail to meet their child's needs."1 The material
capital required includes the time to gain the knowledge needed to
understand what a child is entitled to.2 Finally, of course, the cost of
litigating issues includes substantial time to find and then work with an
attorney and the money to pay for that attorney." 3 All of that, in turn,
requires time away from work."
Wealthier parents have more social capital, require less time to
access resources, and have the money to hire attorneys." They can bear
the cost of time away from their jobs to access and work with attorneys
relatively easily. 6And of course, as in the case of Endrew F., they can
remove their child from a public school, enroll him or her in a private
school, and pay upfront the cost of tuition out of pocket." Low-income
families have less ability to bear these costs and to challenge inadequate
1EPs. " These disparities can leave them accepting those inadequate
IEPs for lack of the ability to pay the transaction costs involved in
challenging them."

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Vincent & Martin, supra note 51, at 113, 121-124.
See id. at 121, 123.
Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1443.
See id. at 1445, 1450.
See id. at 1443.

75. See id. at 1443-45.

76. See id. at 1443.
77. See id. at 1444. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 300.148 (2015).

78. Pasachoff, supra note 25, at 1450.
79. While it is true, as the Supreme Court has made clear, that parents can represent
themselves at hearings, see, e.g., Winkleman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)
(concluding parents have an overlapping right to FAPE and as such can proceed pro se in
litigation), doing so requires substantial knowledge of administrative procedures. See Erin
Phillips, Note, When ParentsAren't Enough: External Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE

L.J. 1802, 1829 (2008) (explaining that the IDEA demands substantial knowledge of "procedural
requirements that can constitute a significant obstacle to effective [pro se] advocacy.").
Therefore, unsurprisingly, unrepresented parents are less likely to prevail. See Perry Zirkel, Are
the Outcomes of Hearing (and Review) Officer Decisions Different for Pro Se and Represented
Parents, J. NAT'L Assoc. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 263, 281 (2015) (finding outcomes for parents

who litigated over special education issues without an attorney were "significantly less favorable"
than for those who had an attorney.).
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C. Most Litigated Special Education Issues
The many disparities outlined above might be of little, or at least less,
concern if they were largely theoretical. If the majority of special
education litigation turned on technical or procedural issues, both of
which would require fewer resources to prove, then disparities resulting
from income inequalities might be minimal. For example, a parent's
allegation that a school failed to provide notice of an IEP meeting would
involve relatively straightforward matters of proof, which arguably
could be handled without marshalling many resources.8" Instead,
however, the most litigated issues are issues of substance. In an analysis
of special education litigation at the administrative hearing level, which
is the first level of incidence for IDEA litigation, spanning 1978-2012,
the two most litigated issues were FAPE and placement.8" Thus, when
IDEA litigation happens, it is about substance and, therefore, requires
the information and resources less available to low-income families.
III. ENDREW F.: EXACERBATES IDEA'S STRUCTURAL
INEQUITIES FOR LOW-INCOME STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES
Endrew F., particularly read in light of Arlington and Schaffer,
exacerbates these disparities affecting low-income children with
disabilities. It further entrenches the disparities in the substantive special
education programs available to low-income children through both its
standard and dicta on applying the standard. Specifically, that dicta
admonishes lower courts to give deference to school officials in
challenges to FAPE. Both make the need for experts more critical to the
development and adequate provision of FAPE. Yet, Arlington makes
access to experts nearly impossible for low-income students with

80. It is not likely such issues would be litigated alone, in large part, because substantive
relief is not available under the IDEA for procedural violations alone. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513
(2015).
81. Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy A. Skidmore, National Trends in the Frequency and Outcomes
in Hearing and Review Officer Decision Under the IDEA: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 29 OHIO ST. J.
DisP. RESOL. 525, 540, 552 (2014).
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disabilities.82 At the same time, Schaffer places the burden of proof on
parents when they seek to challenge the insufficiency of IEPs, thereby
reinforcing the need for experts. When these cases are read together,
Endrew F. only intensifies the uphill battle low-income families face
when trying to avail themselves of the IDEA' s remedies.
A. Endrew F., Arlington & Schaffer
In Endrew F., the Supreme Court held that in order for schools to
comply with the IDEA's FAPE requirement, they must offer an IEP
which is "reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child's circumstances."83 Consequently, when
disputes about FAPE arise, the parties will battle over what constitutes
appropriate progress for a particular child, given his or her particular set
of challenges. Because, under Schaffer, parents who contest an IEP
carry the evidentiary burden of proving its inadequacies, parents will
bear the burden of demonstrating that their child is capable of doing
more than what he or she is achieving in public school with the benefit
of its offered IEP.84 The only convincing way to meet this burden is
through expert testimony. Arlington puts the cost of securing such
experts squarely on parents' shoulders. Thus, Endrew F., particularly
when read in light of Arlington and Schaffer, entrenches the need for
parents to obtain experts to win FAPE claims. The following section
will explore the holdings in each case more fully to demonstrate this
connection.
1. Endrew F.
Endrew F. marks the first time the Supreme Court weighed in on the
substantive requirements of FAPE. Previously, in Rowley, the Court
held that the IDEA required a substantive level of education but
declined "to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of

82. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
83. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
84. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005).
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educational benefits." 5 The Endrew F. holding speaks to the
"adequacy" piece, clarifying that to be adequate, an IEP must be
"reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in
light of the child's circumstances." 6 By holding such, the Court rejects
the previously held notion that mere trivial progress satisfies the IDEA's
FAPE entitlement.8
Notably, the Court declined to develop a bright line rule defining
"appropriate progress" in all cases. Rather, the Court stated, "The
adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child
for whom it was created."88 For children with disabilities who are able to
achieve on grade level, the Court said that progress in the general
curriculum may satisfy FAPE. However, citing Rowley, the Court again
declined to hold that "every handicapped child who is advancing from
grade to grade...is automatically receiving a [FAPE]."8 9 For children
with disabilities unable to achieve at grade level, like the plaintiff in
Endrew F., the Court stated that progress must be "appropriately
ambitious in light of [the child' s] circumstances.''9
Essentially, then, progress in all cases must be defined with respect to
each individual child and, at least in certain circumstances, must be
"appropriately ambitious." In some instances, such as when the child is
able to be fully integrated with his or her peers, the Court noted that it
may be easier to align appropriate progress to grade level achievement
norms. In other instances, where a child's disability is so challenging
that achievement on grade level is not possible, the Court said progress
still must be aligned with that particular child's capabilities.
Consequently, defining a child's capabilities in order to set
''appropriately ambitious" goals is essential to the adequate provision of
FAPE. As Section III will explain, this standard, and accompanying
dicta, puts parents and particularly low-income parents at a
disadvantage when defining those goals.

85. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 998 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.,
Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 999.
87. Id. at 1000-01.
88. Id. at 1001.
89. Id. at 1002 n.2.
90. Id. at 1001.
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The Court went further in its dicta and emphasized in multiple ways
the importance teachers and other school officials play in determining
both the educational capabilities as well as the needs of a child. First, it
admonished lower courts to grant school officials deference in defining
"appropriate progress" and warned against courts "substitut[ing] their
own notions of sound educational policy for those of school authorities
which they review."9 Essentially, the Court said that because school
officials rely on their expertise to determine where to set the goalposts for
an individual child, their opinions should carry weight when challenged.
Second, the Court also suggested that deference be granted to school
officials in the drafting of IEPs because they are prospective. It adopted
the "reasonably calculated" language from Rowley, noting that "crafting
an appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgement"
informed by the "expertise of school officials."92 Finally, the Court
suggested that this deference in favor of schools will be counterbalanced
by "the nature of the IEP process," including the availability of due
process, which "ensures that parents and school representatives will fully
air their respective opinions on the degree of progress a child's IEP
should pursue. "
The Court's standard, therefore, assumes and even relies on the
ability of parents to be equal partners in the IEP process but fails to
consider that not all parents are equally suited to perform that role.
Furthermore, the standard makes it harder for parents to perform that
role by privileging the input of teachers and other school staff in its
dicta. By underscoring the importance of school authorities' opinions
and relying on administrative hearings to serve as adequate checks on
schools, the Court places its thumb on the scale in favor of schools over
parents in any disputes about the adequate provision of FAPE. In
essence, the Endrew F. standard all but requires parents to retain experts
in order to prove school officials' judgements incorrect. And, as
Schaffer and Arlington make clear, the evidentiary burden and costs
associated with the need for those experts rests with parents.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 999.
93. Id. at 1001.
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2. Arlington & Schaffer
In Arlington CentralSchool District Board of Education v. Murphy,94
the Supreme Court held that expert witnesses' fees are not recoverable
by parents prevailing in challenges under the IDEA.95 In Schaffer v.
Weast,96 the Supreme Court held that the burden of proof in IEP
challenges is on the moving party, typically the parents.9 Both rulings
reversed long-standing practices in several jurisdictions of awarding
expert fees to the prevailing party and assigning the burden of proof to
school districts.98 While both decisions have been criticized by scholars
and advocates alike,9 9 the soundness of these rulings are beyond the
scope of this article. However, their effect on low-income parents is
central to it.
Both decisions changed the landscape of IDEA challenges in ways
that negatively impacted low-income parents' ability to access IDEA's
remedial measures."' 0 Arlington made special education cases more
costly to litigate by foreclosing options low-income parents had
available for accessing the assistance of expert witnesses. Prior to
Arlington, low-income parents could, for example, obtain the help of
experts because their attorneys would front the cost of expert fees or the
experts would work on a contingency fee basis. When Arlington cut off
the possibility of reimbursement for expert fees to prevailing parties,
these options became far less viable."0 ' For low-income parents, this also
equates to even fewer attorneys willing to take on their special
education case, or pushes the costs associated with securing an attorney

94. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
95. See id.
96. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
97. See id.
98. The Court in Schaffer clarified that its holding did not affect states that wanted to
"override the default rule and put the burden always on the school district." Id. at 61. However, in
states that are silent on burden of proof, the Schaffer ruling places it on the moving party.
99. See Thomason, supra note 22 (discussing the impacts of the two cases on parents' ability
to successfully engage IDEA's remedies); see also Leslie Reed, Is A Free Appropriate Public
Education Really Free? How the Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children
with Autism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 251, 252 (2008) (criticizing Arlington, particularly its impact
on parents of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder).
100. See Thomason, supra note 22.
101. Reed, supra note 99, at 252.
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out of reach."°2 Schaeffer, too, makes special education cases more
difficult to litigate and winning more tenuous. It requires parents to
marshal more and better evidence, which in turn results in more
expensive litigation costs." °3 Although some of these costs-attorneys'
10 4
fees-are recoverable, they are only granted to the prevailing party.
Thus, both cases effectively made access to attorneys more difficult, and
both made proceeding pro se more costly.
B. The Combined Problems
Endrew F. exacerbates the problems created by Schaffer and
Arlington, particularly for low-income parents, in two ways. First,
combining a standard which elevates the need for experts with an
enforcement process that puts those experts out of reach for many lowincome parents unjustly tilts the balance in favor of schools when
parents seek to challenge the inadequate provision of FAPE. Second,
elevating the expertise of school officials in the development of
sufficient IEPs with an administrative process that places the burden of
proof on parents further disadvantages parents attempting to enforce
their child' s right to FAPE.
1. Problems created by Endrew F. 's Standard
There are three overarching problems with Endrew F. 's holding,
especially when read together with Schaffer and Arlington, for lowincome parents of children with disabilities. First, it exacerbates
information asymmetries that already exist between schools and parents.
Second, it intensifies the leverage inadequacies facing these parents.
Third, it increases the transaction costs associated with parents' ability
to successfully access the IDEA's remedies.
a. Exacerbates information asymmetries
102. Neeta Pal, Cut Off & Cut Out: Funding Shotfalls Force More Low-Income Families to
Face Critical Legal Needs Alone, BRENNAN

CENTER FOR JUSTICE

(May

19,

2011),

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/Ufles/egacy/New%20needs%20update%20FINAL%
20as%20of%205-19-11.pdf.
103. See Thomason, supra note 22.
104. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B).
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Schools, not parents, have access to most of the relevant information
needed to determine whether an IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable
a child to make progress in light of his or her circumstances." ' 5 In order
for parents to level the playing field, they need a way to access all, and
potentially more, information than is available to the school. While the
IDEA gives parents the right to inspect and copy educational records
relating to their child, as well as a seat at the table whenever educational
decisions about their child are being discussed,1 0 6 as described in Part
I.B., merely being present at the table does not guarantee equal
participation.1 0 7 Rather, in order to know whether a school is truly
setting goals that enable a child to make "progress appropriate in light
of his or her [unique] circumstances, ' ° parents will need access to
specialized information about their child's disability, including its
impact on education as well as the best ways to remediate those impacts.
Because the Court's new standard defines appropriate progress in
relation to each individual child's ability, it becomes paramount to
determine what that ability is. This is particularly true when a child's
progress cannot be aligned to grade level standards. Although grade
level standards can provide at least some metric for determining
appropriate progress, for some students, grade level standards are not
appropriate.0 9 In those cases, no such metric exists. ° Instead, their IEPs
must be "appropriately ambitious," a much more amorphous concept."
When school officials are the only experts available to guide this
prospective inquiry, parents are at their mercy for determining whether
IEPs enable appropriate progress. However, when parents are able to
access outside expert opinions, they can, like the plaintiffs in Endrew F.,
provide additional data which help re-define their child's capabilities
ensuring that his or her goals are, in fact, "ambitious."

105. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
106. 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(1).
107. See supra Part Lb.
108. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 1002.
109. See id. at 1001.
110. See id. at 1002 n.2 (acknowledging that grade level standards are not mandatory metric
and may not always be appropriate measure of JEP goals, even for children who are capable of
achieving them).
111. Id. at 1000.
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Because low-income parents are often at a greater disadvantage than
wealthier parents when it comes to accessing this external information
due to depleted social and material capital, they are less able to
overcome these information asymmetries."' In fact, the only compelling
way to push back on school expert opinion is for parents to retain
independent experts to provide a countervailing opinion. But, Arlington,
limits low-income parents' ability to procure the necessary evidence to
provide that ammunition.
b. Intensifies leverage inadequacies
The Endrew F. ruling also intensifies the leverage inadequacies lowincome parents face in two key ways. First, the standard itself
incorporates the caveat of "reasonable" as opposed to "ideal" in relation
to the prospective drafting of IEPs."' Second, the Court invests its trust
in the due process procedures as an effective check on school actions.
Low-income parents, for the many reasons stated, have less ability to
mount successful FAPE challenges as such cases place the burden of
proof on parents and require the out-of-pocket costs of experts and
attorneys for maximum success.114 Consequently, parents with limited
financial resources have little ability to use litigation or the threat of
litigation as a check on school behavior on the front or back end of this
process.
On the front end, IEP development, the Endrew F. standard mandates
"reasonably" calculated IEPs. 5 While this may, in fact, be an
appropriate qualifier due to the IEP's prospective nature, it is a
relatively easy standard for schools to prove they have met. Because
IEPs need only be reasonable prospectively, schools can defend them by
arguing that even if IEPs were not reasonable in retrospect, they were
reasonable at the time they were drafted. Consequently, parents
attempting to prove an IEP was prospectively not reasonable face a

112. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
113. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 1001 ("[The IDEA] requires an educational program reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.").
114. While parents can proceed to hearings pro se, studies demonstrate that legal
representation markedly improves hearing outcomes. See Zirkel, supra note 79.
115. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 1001.
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monumental task. The deference sewn into this standard virtually
requires that parents have experts available to them at the design stage
to ensure that the school's assumptions as to their child's needs and
capabilities are grounded in evidence. Without experts or attorneys
present at the initial design stage, parents are again at the mercy of
schools and have less ability to challenge what schools deem reasonably
appropriate for their child. Further, without the threat of litigation at the
initial design stage, schools are less likely to engage in a "bilateral
exchange of promises" and, in the worst-case scenarios, are more likely
to offer inadequate and insufficient services." 6
Once the IEP has been implemented, if parents are dissatisfied with
results, the Court in Endrew F. suggests that the administrative process
will ensure an adequate result. ' The Court's previous decisions in
Arlington and Schaffer, however, make that unlikely for two reasons.
First, the likelihood of securing experts, and therefore succeeding in
litigation, is more challenging. Second, the inability to secure experts
makes it harder for parents to get an attorney. Without an attorney,
parents are much less likely to succeed in IEP litigation, especially
because Schaffer places the burden of proof on them. Essentially,
litigation, or threat of it, offers much less leverage against the schools.
The leverage inadequacies result in a failure to assert any pressure on
school districts who have the advantage of experts, attorneys, and a
FAPE standard that is highly individualized and provides some
deference to the design stage.
c. Increases transactioncosts
Finally, the Endrew F. standard increases the transaction costs
associated with challenging FAPE. While transaction costs already
weigh more heavily on low-income parents for all the reasons set forth
above, the standard all but forces parents who wish to successfully
challenge FAPE to secure their own expert in order to demonstrate the
school either set artificially low goals or failed to provide the necessary
services to help their child progress. Endrew F. did not set forth a bright

116. Caruso, supra note 27 at 179.
117. See Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 1001-02.
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line test to determine when FAPE has been met; rather, appropriate
progress is tied to each individual child's circumstances. While such a
rule may fulfill IDEA's purpose more closely than a bright line rule, it
also makes the analysis around sufficiency of FAPE more difficult and
costly to prove.
Because proving the Endrew F. standard requires experts, it, coupled
with Arlington, increases the transaction costs of IDEA enforcement.
Accessing experts not only requires financial resources, but also social
capital. It requires parents to have social networks to inform them of
these experts and their availability. Without the ability to shoulder these
transaction costs, parents will not be able to meet the burden of proof
imposed on them by Schaffer.
2. Problems created by Endrew F. 's Deference Admonishment
Endrew F. cautions lower courts to not "substitute their own notions
of sound educational policy for those of school authorities" in applying
the FAPE standard. It cautions lower courts to give deference to the
"expertise and the exercise of judgment by school authorities." ' At the
same time, the Court assumes "the IEP process, from initial consultation
through state administrative proceedings, [will ensure] that parents and
school representatives will fully air their respective opinions.""9' ' But,
because Arlington makes experts out of reach for low-income families,
schools' deference will go unchecked and the IDEA's administrative
proceedings will prove an insufficient remedy. In essence, the Court's
deference admonishment continues to exacerbate the information,
leverage, and transaction asymmetries affecting low-income parents
who seek to challenge FAPE.
a. Exacerbates information asymmetries
The Court's deference admonishment virtually requires parents to
secure experts in any challenge to FAPE because, without experts, there
is simply nothing to call the school's deference into question. To

118. Id. at 999.
119. Id. at 1001.
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successfully challenge a school's deference as to what their child is
capable of, as well as what special education supports and services she
may need, parents must be armed with information which will help
them serve as a check on the school's expertise. For the many reasons
previously discussed, low-income parents have less access to this
information. Thus, low-income parents will be in a less suitable position
to challenge the school's opinion, particularly when school opinions are
given deference by courts.
b. Intensifies leverage externalities
The Court's deference admonishment also intensifies the burden of
leverage inadequacies for low-income parents. After Endrew F., schools
will engage in IEP planning with the knowledge that their opinions will
be given deference should parents ever challenge them through an
administrative complaint. This knowledge puts schools comfortably in
the driver's seat, particularly when combined with the effects of
Arlington and Schaffer. Low-income parents with less access to
attorneys and experts will not have the ability to realistically threaten
litigation. Therefore, they will lack the leverage necessary to offer an
effective check on schools' opinions. Instead, they will be forced into a
unilateral acceptance of special education services designed and offered
12
by the school without the leverage to push for more or better services. 1
c. Increases transactioncosts
Finally, the deference admonishment increases the transaction costs
low-income parents will need to bear in order to successfully challenge
FAPE. The Supreme Court, by requiring lower courts to give schools
deference, has essentially put a thumb on the scale in any administrative
IDEA challenges brought by parents. Now, parents not only will have to
shoulder the burden of proof, but also overcome the deference afforded
to school decisions about FAPE. The combined burdens will produce

120. This commentary is by no means a critique of all school officials, many, if not, most of
whom enter the IEP design process with a genuine desire to ensure appropriate services for a
child, but rather aimed at the times when schools are either ignorant of their IDEA responsibilities
or unwilling to dedicate the resources necessary to fulfill them.
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more complicated lawsuits with the need to hire and elicit expert
testimony. Ultimately, the Court's deference admonishment only adds
to the steep transaction costs parents face in asserting IDEA's due
process remedy.

C. Independent Educational Evaluations and Civil Legal Aid: No
Panaceas
Critics may claim that the IDEA's due process procedures serve as an
adequate check on schools' duty to provide FAPE, citing specifically to
(1) the IDEA's provision offering parents an independent educational
evaluation when they disagree with the school's evaluation, and (2) the
availability of free legal assistance to mount due process complaints. As
the following section illuminates, neither is an adequate safeguard on a
school's ability to railroad low-income parents through the IEP process.
The IDEA offers parents the ability to request an independent
educational evaluation (IEE) at public expense when they feel that the
school's evaluation is inadequate. 2 1 IEEs can provide valuable insight
and powerful leverage for parents who are able to secure them.
However, requesting an IEE does not equate to automatic receipt of one.
Rather, schools can push back if they feel their evaluation is adequate
and force parents to demonstrate why the school's evaluation is
insufficient.1 22 If schools choose to fight the IEE request, parents will
need an expert opinion to demonstrate why the school evaluation is
inadequate, in all but the most patently obvious cases. Second, while
IEE's can provide valuable information, they are typically directed at
eligibility for special education services. 23 They may not always
address other important issues, such as whether the child has the
capacity to learn or the child's optimal rate of progress. Finally, even
with the best IEE, parents are entitled to only the evaluation itself, but
not to an expert who will explain the report at a due process hearing or
even an IEP meeting.1 24 Parents who are unable to pay for an expert to
address the report in an IEP meeting, will make themselves vulnerable
121.
122.
123.
124.

20 USC §1415(b)(1).
34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (b)(2).
See id.
See id.
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to the school district's interpretation of the IEE. Thus, while IEE's are
an important tool in creating some leverage for parents, they are not an
across the board panacea for parents seeking to challenge a denial of
FAPE.
With regard to free civil legal services, the shortage of civil legal
1 25
services is well-documented and has been a problem for decades.
Thus, even those parents who have the will and agency necessary to
reach out for free legal services are often unable to find a lawyer simply
because of the shortage of attorneys available to take their case. As
many scholars have demonstrated, lawyers are crucial to a successful
outcome in due process proceedings.1 26 Thus, while the ability to seek
legal assistance is theoretically available to low-income parents, in
practice it is, for most, an empty promise. Thus, neither IEEs nor free
legal assistance adequately protect parents' ability to serve as a check
against the school district to ensure the adequate provision of FAPE.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
While Endrew F.'s new standard creates several obstacles for lowincome parents claiming a denial of FAPE, the underlying problem does
not lie within the standard itself but rather with the burdens placed on
low-income parents seeking to avail themselves of IDEA's remedies.
The Court in Endrew F. correctly fashioned a standard that is tied to
each child's unique circumstances. As the Court stated, "a focus on the
particular child is at the core of the IDEA. 1 2 ' Thus, a bright line
standard would not adequately respect the individualized nature of IEP
determinations. However, by setting a highly individualized standard
and granting deference to schools in the creation of IEPs, the Court
further weakened the efficacy of the IDEA's remedies for parents with
limited financial resources. Consequently, an appropriate legislative fix
would be to strengthen parents' ability to mount a successful challenge
to the provision of FAPE. Congress could do so by making expert fees

125. See Pal, supra note 102.
126. See sources cited supra note 79.
127. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
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recoverable and by shifting the burden of proof to schools in challenges
to FAPE.
Expert opinions are central to any well-designed IEP. When schools
have well-trained and unbiased experts on staff who are able to
contribute to IEP development, the FAPE standard is likely met.
However, when schools' experts are not up to par, or when legitimate
disputes arise about the nature of a child's disability or effects of that
disability, a second expert opinion is needed to ensure parents an
effective seat at the table. Were Congress to allow parents to recover
costs of experts in administrative challenges to FAPE, they would be far
less burdened by the information inadequacies and transaction costs
exacerbated by Endrew F. Parents would be better suited to acquire
second opinions when necessary to ensure their rights under the
IDEA. 128
Similarly, Congress should amend the IDEA to shift the burden of
proof to school districts in all administrative proceedings about the
sufficiency of FAPE. Schools have the affirmative duty to provide
FAPE, thus they should be the ones to demonstrate how they met that
duty when challenged. Alternatively, Congress could amend the IDEA
to shift the burden of proof to schools any time the evidence
demonstrated that a child's IEP had repeated goals for two consecutive
years without demonstrating progress toward those goals. Both
amendments are meant to alleviate the information, leverage, and
transactional asymmetries levied against parents, and particularly lowincome parents, who seek to avail themselves of IDEA remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
While Endrew F.'s holding was certainly a long-awaited victory for
the many children with disabilities who were receiving what equated to

128. As Justice Ginsburg aptly stated in her dissent to Arlington's majority opinion, the Court
is unable to re-write the IDEA, rather, "[t]he ball, I conclude, is properly left in Congress' court to
provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing expenses beyond those IDEA and its
implementing regulations already authorize, along with any specifications, conditions or
limitations geared to those fees and expenses Congress may deem appropriate." Arlington Cent.
Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Arlington, 548 U.S. 291, 307 (2006).
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"barely more than de minimis" progress under their IEPs, it is not the
cure needed to address the IDEA's remedial disparities. Rather, Endrew
F. 's holding and related dicta, when combined with the Court's rulings
in Arlington and Schaffer, add more weight to the burden parents' must
carry in order to successfully avail themselves of the IDEA's remedies.
This burden is felt most keenly by parents of limited financial means
who are unable to pay for experts and attorneys who would help them
carry this weight and serve as a true check on a school's duty to provide
a FAPE that enables their child "to make progress appropriate in light of
[his or her] circumstances. ' 29

129. Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. at 1002.

